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Abstract This study seeks to explain the profound discord currently observable in elite
political discourse on Chinese investments in many host countries. Using Argentina as
a case study, a combination of quantitative content analysis and qualitative discourse
analysis was employed to analyze parliamentary speeches on a controversial space-
monitoring station built there by China in 2015. The study finds that the competing
discourses about China in Argentinean politics draw primarily on locally embedded
contexts and the region’s particular historical experiences and geopolitical position.
These local narratives are used in different ways by both sides of the debate to support
contradicting positions on relevant issues. Questions of regional hegemony, center-
periphery relations, national autonomy as well as Peronist and anti-Peronist ideologies
are being drawn on by elite politicians in an attempt to cope with the deep uncertainty
about what China’s increased engagement means for the country and to compensate for
the lack of predictability about China’s behavior in its future role as a major global
power. Ultimately, however, Argentina’s elite politicians end up in a dilemma in which
these narratives and historical memories can be spun in both ways to either support or
reject a controversial investment project to go ahead on domestic soil that is, at the
same time, a symbolic test for the potential depth of the future relationship with China.
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BIn five years, China will be the world’s most important economic actor [...] how
can you expect us not to have a strategic relationship with it if they bring us
investments? Why are you so fearful of the Chinese?^
President Cristina F. de Kirchner - opening of legislative session, speech to the
legislators, March 2015.
Introduction
In December 2014, the Argentinean Senate approved an agreement on cooperation
between Argentina and China on the BConstruction, Establishment, and Operation of a
Chinese Deep-Space Monitoring Station^ in the Argentinean Province of Neuquén. It
was set within the framework of the Chinese Moon Exploration Program. The agree-
ment to build this station immediately generated a lot of criticism from politicians,
journalists, and academics, who raised concerns about issues such as the possible
military use of the facilities, the magnitude of the tax breaks granted to the Chinese,
the limited access granted to Argentine scientists and its alleged level of secrecy.
Such criticisms of Chinese investments are not new, and have been widespread in
many parts of the world ([22]: 107). Chinese investments have tended to shoulder a
particularly heavy baggage of political controversy, as the majority of investments are
carried out by State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and government support for outward
investments is intensive [26, 34, 46]. Uncertainties about China’s future role as a global
economic and political power further exacerbate stakeholder concerns in host countries
over issues such as national security, unfair competition, and state ownership. In Britain,
the May administration’s summer 2016 announcement to review Chinese participation
in the construction of the Hinkley Point C nuclear power plant is just another more
recent example of the political consequences these uncertainties about China bring with
them. Nevertheless, scholarship to date has not conclusively pinned down the reasons
why China and Chinese investments have received such an above-average amount of
scrutiny by host country stakeholders over the past few years – much more than firms
from the United States (US) or other countries commonly receive.
The strong criticism of Chinese investments is even more puzzling when viewed
against the backdrop of rapidly intensifying economic and investment relations with
China. In Latin America, China has become a major external economic actor over the
past decade – in 2014, the country was already the second largest trade partner and a
major source of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows in Latin America. Several
Latin American countries have established strategic partnerships with Beijing, which
implies greater cooperation on FDI-related matters and a positive attitude towards
China. This is a significant advance, considering the fact that Latin America has
traditionally been the backbone of American hemispheric hegemony [30].
Within Latin America, Argentina has developed one of the strongest relationships
with China [25]. In July 2014, when Xi Jinping visited Argentina, both countries signed
several multi-billion dollar agreements on infrastructure finance and currency swap
arrangements, and a new framework agreement on cooperation in economic and
investment matters was agreed. Impeded from accessing western financing, China’s
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emergence as a new Latin American creditor provided the country with a funding source
that was independent of global financing markets [4, 19]. During Hu Jintao’s visit to
South America in 2004, Argentina and China had already signed a memorandum on
cooperation in trade and investment that defined the partnership as Bstrategic.^.1
TheArgentinean approach toChina is similar to that ofmany host countries in other parts
of the world that are actively attracting and promoting Chinese investments. Many compa-
nies even happily agree to become a target of a Chinese acquiring firm [21]. However, these
very positive views and eagerness to court Chinese investors greatly contradict the many
criticisms commonly voiced about Chinese investments. Hence, there exist major contro-
versies and contradictions in perceptions about Chinese FDI and reactions to them. In fact,
these differences in perspective about Chinese outward FDI form one of the biggest
unresolved puzzles about China’s economic expansion into the rest of the world.
In this study, we seek to gain greater understanding of the origins of these controversies
and contradictory perceptions and examine the nature of the discourses employed to support
competing arguments about Chinese investments. We analyze in detail what type of
discourses elected politicians in Argentina use to argue in favour or against the space-
monitoring station. Why do they adopt an overly critical view of Chinese FDI in Argentina,
or why do they view the issue in a positive light?Where do the differences in arguments lie?
For the purpose of our analysis, the value of the Chinese space-monitoring station
project in Argentina is twofold. First, its nature—a mix of science and high politics—
makes it an interesting case for understanding fears over an increasing Chinese
presence in Latin America; second, it is China’s only investment project that has ever
been discussed in Congress in Argentina.
We took a mixed-method approach, employing both quantitative text analysis and
qualitative political discourse analysis to analyze all parliamentary speeches in the Senate
and the Chamber discussing the approval of the cooperation agreement between Argentina
and China. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to examine domestic
political discourses on the emergence of Chinese investors in LatinAmerica.While China’s
ascendance in Latin America has been studied through purely quantitative methods [49],
no one has yet focused on specific case studies of individual countries.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we describe the nature
of the Chinese space-monitoring station. Then, we discuss the existing literature on
congressional debates in Argentina as well as the state of the art of the literature on
Chinese engagement in Latin America to propose three hypotheses. Afterwards, we
describe our methodology and we proceed to disentangle the embedded perceptions of
Chinese investments in political debate. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the
findings and policy implications, and develop a future research agenda.
Framing the Case Study: Argentina, an Appealing Country for Space
Science
As a growing global power with leadership ambitions, China started developing
programs aimed at exploring the Moon and other celestial bodies, Mars in particular.
1 According to the Chinese media, the term Bstrategic partnership^ is the ultimate definition of bilateral
relations [36].
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To this end, China established the so-called China Deep Space Network, a series of
monitoring stations in order to support various space missions as the planet rotates.
This project, by its very nature, enhances China’s global capabilities in science and
military fields. China needs strategically-located stations in various parts of the world,
and the Patagonian region in Argentina proved to have the correct geographical
conditions for the installation of one of them.
In Argentina, the organization in charge of scientific activities related to astronomy
is the National Commission on Space Activities (CONAE). In 2004, after Hu Jintao’s
visit to the country, a framework of cooperation agreement between CONAE and
China’s National Space Agency (CNSA) was signed, recognizing the potential for
joint activities between the two agencies. After a joint assessment, it was decided that
the base would be installed on 200 ha of land in the area of Bajada Del Agrio, an
isolated sub region of Patagonia.
OnApril 23, 2014 a provincial lawwas approved establishing tax breaks and a relaxation
of immigration rules for Chinese officials involved in the project. This was the subject of
great debate among the congressional commissions, making this project markedly more
politicized than others. Even though the station was already being built, the project was
submitted to the National Congress in July of 2014 for discussion in both houses.
In November of 2014, after the provincial law was already enacted,2 the province of
Neuquén approved a tax exemption for the China Harbour Engineering Company, the
Chinese company in charge of building the station, and granted exemptions of VAT,
customs duties, and internal taxes to the CNSA and other companies for the duration of
the concession (50 years). Furthermore, it allowed Chinese employees working in
Neuquén to be governed under the laws of China.
Set against this Chinese deep space-monitoring station project is the case of a similar
station built by the European Space Agency (ESA) in 2012. This station was inaugu-
rated in Malargue, in the province of Mendoza. As with the Chinese project,
Argentina’s CONAE was involved in the early technical assessments and the first
cooperation agreements in 2009. Figure 1 shows the location of the ESA and the
CNSA’s space-monitoring stations. Both are located in the western part of the country,
close to the border with Chile.
Moreover, Table 1 shows how both agreements were very similar in content, yet
exhibited a few notable differences. While Article 1 of the agreement with the ESA
established the mandatory use for peaceful ends, the agreement with the CNSA only
mentioned it in the introduction as part of the Bspirit^ of the project.3
Both agreements were identical in that they established a cession of land for a period
of 50 years; included termination clauses and controversy-solving mechanisms; and
incorporated an agreement that Argentine scientists would be allowed to use the facility
for 10% of the time. As for the differences, there were no tax exemptions for the ESA,
while there were for the CNSA, and European technicians did not receive migratory
benefits as the Chinese did.
2 Law no. 27,123 of the 6th of November.
3 Nevertheless, in 2004 a technical cooperation agreement for the BPeaceful Use of Outer Space^ had already
been signed between CONAE and CNSA, and included wording similar to that in the introduction of the
agreement with the ESA.
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Companies and entities with connections to military projects constructed both
stations. The China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General, the entity that
controls the space-monitoring station, is subordinate to the People’s Liberation Army’s
General Armaments Department (GAD), while the Italian company Telespazio is
Fig. 1 Location of the European and Chinese space-monitoring stations in Argentina
Table 1 Comparison between agreements
European station Chinese station
The agreement provides for mandatory use for peaceful ends Yes (Art.1) No (but mentioned in intro)
The agreement is for a period of 50 years. Yes Yes
There is territorial cession Yes Yes
Tax exemptions No Yes
Migratory benefits No Yes
Agreement can be terminated Yes Yes
Sum of time used by Argentine scientists 10% 10%
Estimated cost €45 million US$ 300 million
Operated by: ESOC / Telespazio Argentina CLTC
Built by: SED Systems (Canada) & Vertex
Antennentechnik (Germany)
China Harbour Engineering
Company
Subcontracted Argentine companies Yes Yes
Source: Elaborated by the authors
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partially owned by the Thales group, which works on security and defense projects
(such as cybersecurity, drones, and defensive missiles) for European countries. The
China Harbour Engineering Company subcontracted Esuco SA for the construction of
the stations, and the ESA subcontracted Carlucci, Pascual Casetta, Alcatraz, and
Desarrolladora Monteverdi—all Argentine companies. Finally, China’s project had a
budget almost five times larger than the ESA’s. The European base was budgeted at €45
million (approximately US$63 million), and the Chinese base was budgeted at US$300
million. All of these points triggered discussions among congressional representatives.
In Argentina, other investments have also inspired domestic debate. Historically, the
most politicized investments were those of the Americans and Spanish companies,4 but
even with regards to China, the space-monitoring station was not the first deal to generate
controversy. In 2011, the governor of the province of Rio Negro, also located in the
Patagonian region, signed a deal with an SOE from Heilongjiang province for the use of
300,000 ha of land to grow crops for a period of 20 years. The deal generated so much
opposition from the press, academic circles, and public opinion in general that it ended up
being cancelled.5 This background suggests that Chinese investments might inspire certain
concerns that Western investments do not, but what are these concerns specifically?
Literature Review
Research that uses speeches and votes to study congressional position taking, oversight and
signaling is vast in the American Political Science literature [1, 11, 20, 28, 40]. These works
served as a framework for the development of similar research in Latin America, although
the literature employing such approaches is still sparse in both LatinAmerica andArgentina.
The Argentine Congress does not ratify treaties; it merely approves or rejects the text of a
treaty. Beforehand, projects are discussed in commissions and are only subject to nominal
voting if parties do not reach a consensus in the commissions. The fact that an international
agreement was subject to a vote is thus proof that it triggered considerable debate. The
image of the US is, along with the amount of state intervention in the economy, the most
relevant dimension of political party polarization in Latin America, including Argentina
[43]. Foreign policy as regards the US has been largely determined by domestic politics in
Argentina, and alignswith the ideology of the party of the president and his/her cabinet [35].
Since the return to democracy in 1983, the two dominant political parties in
Argentina have been the Partido Justicialista (PJ, also known as the Peronist Party)
and the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR). Peronism historically accused opposition parties
of being functional to the interests of the US. It started as a political movement inspired
in the populist government of Juan Domingo Peron, who presided Argentina on three
opportunities (1946–1952; 1952–1955; 1973–1974). The famous political campaign
slogan that led Peron to his first presidency in 1946 was BBraden or Peron^, with
4 One example is the partial renationalization in 2012 of YPF, the nation’s largest energy firm, in the interest of
energy sovereignty. YPF was previously owned by the Spanish Repsol.
5 For example, the Faculty of Agricultural Sciences of the National University of Comahue criticized this
agreement since the investment could Bcompromise the food sovereignty and sustainability^ [27]. While the
main argument was land grabbing, at the time of the debate, the Italian textile company Benetton already
owned 900,000 ha—about three times the area of Hong Kong—in Patagonia to raise cattle. This fact was
largely overlooked.
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reference to Spruille Braden, the US ambassador to Argentina who had mobilized the
opposition against Peron.
The Kirchnerismo (the branch of Peronism led by the Kirchners) made intensive use
of this rhetoric. Although less than other populist movements during the Pink Tide such
as Chavismo in Venezuela or Correismo in Ecuador, Kirchners made their opposition to
the US a key theme of their foreign policy. Moreover, while Menem’s (1989–1999) and
De la Rúa’s (1999–2001) administrations reflected an automatic alliance with the US,
Duhalde (2002–2003), Nestor Kirchner (2003–2007), and Cristina Kirchner (2007–
2015) adopted a much more autonomous policy, with traces of anti-Americanism,
which defined a new shift in foreign policy.
Argentina spent most of the twentieth century looking first at the UK and later at the US
and, in a secondary way, Brazil.6 China remained in a second—or even third—tier group.
During the 1990s, it is worth noting, however, that the alignment with theUS did not impede
Argentina from following a relatively autonomous foreign policy towards China. The most
notable example is the position of Argentina towards the 1989 incident on Tiananmen
Square, when President Menem pursued a different policy than President George Bush, and
was the first Head of State of a Western country to visit China in a moment in which the
Chinese government was being highly criticized for human rights violations [37].
Only in the twenty-first century did China emerge as an important actor in Latin
America and Argentina. Latin American countries embraced the rhetoric of South-South
relations, advanced to a considerable extent by China itself, as a way to increase their
autonomy from the US. The concept of autonomy, particularly towards the US, is essential
for understanding the foreign policies of Latin American countries. This concept, which
has been discussed for many decades by political scientists [45] refers to the ability to self-
government and self-control a country has on a political dimension ([41]: 165).
Latin American countries embraced China as part of a new multidirectional diplo-
macy aimed at diversifying their foreign relations [47]. China was seriously looked at
as an Balternative diplomatic and economic partner to Washington^ ([24]: 139).
Flores-Macías and Kreps [9] found that states which trade more with China are more
likely to converge with it on issues of foreign policy [9]. Similarly, Urdinez et al. [49]
find that there is an inverse relationship between the investments made by Chinese
SOEs / Chinese bank loans on the one hand, and the US influence in each country on
the other hand, suggesting that China is filling a vacuum. This effect of enhanced
political closeness between China and its economic partners generates foreign policy
consequences, especially for the US which may see China emerge to counterbalance its
influence. Beijing’s official interests in Latin America hardly remain restricted to the
economic realm, but instead follow the rationale of a ‘comprehensive cooperation’ that
also encompasses political aspects [48].
6 Argentina underwent three foreign policy stages. Before World War II, it had three main orientations:
Europeanism, opposition to the US, and isolation from the rest of Latin America. Between the end of World
War II and the end of the Cold War, Argentina maintained non-alignment with respect to the US and vowed
Latin American integration without doing much to deliver ( [42]: 266). After the Cold War, Peronist president
Menem steered foreign policy toward subordination to the political and strategic interests of the US. This
period ended dramatically in 2001 when the country defaulted on foreign debt and the worst economic crisis in
Argentine history unfolded.
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The above discussion suggests that when considering Argentina’s relationship with
China, the US can either function as a mirroring case for comparison or be viewed as a
power to be counterbalanced by turning to an alternative. The relationship with the US
should therefore be expected to surface in the discourses advanced by deputies in the
Argentine Congress:
Hypothesis 1: Attitudes towards the US as the historical hegemon in the region
are being projected onto the relationship between Argentina and China and the
role the space-monitoring station plays in this relationship.
In Latin American countries, a fierce debate has been ongoing for at least a
decade on the appropriate way to engage with China. Blázquez and Santiso [2]
bluntly ask whether China is an Bangel^ or a Bdevil^ for Latin America. Those
favorable to greater engagement with China point to win-win scenarios in which
China provides Latin American countries with aid ([6]:12), trade flows [5], FDI
[7] and political cooperation [15] in exchange for political support in international
organizations and long-term business opportunities for Chinese companies. As a
result of the so-called BPink Tide^ of leftist governments in Latin America, an
interesting pragmatic convergence with China came about: the state was granted
an important role in the economy, and fresh money to carry out infrastructure
projects was needed [10, 15]. The Chinese government itself claims that the
China–Latin America economic relationship reflects fundamental complementar-
ities and therefore has a positive effect for both sides ([8]: 57).
Yet, concerns about greater engagement with China are numerous. There are
worries about economic and political imbalances created by China’s growing
influence in the region. Trading with China is seen to have a detrimental effect
on the national economies, resulting in trade deficits and possibly deindustriali-
zation. There is also fear of increased Bprimarization^ of the economies, resulting
from a specialization on primary product exports in exchange for industrial
products from China [13, 14, 23, 31]. This would result in a reproduction of
neocolonial/neo-dependent relationships, where the asymmetric nature of the
relationship in terms of the relative importance of bilateral trade to each partner,
the composition of trade flows, and the balance of FDI flows exhibits many
characteristics of typical center–periphery relations [13]. A generation from now,
Latin Americans may well be denouncing Chinese Bimperialism^ and
Bexploitation^ of the Americas, just as they had denounced American and British,
and even Spanish, Bcolonialisms^ and Bimperialisms^ in the past ([39]: 20).
Moreover, doubts have been raised on whether fertile ground for long-term
mutual benefits actually exists. China’s rapidly increasing imports of raw
materials from Latin America were allegedly a consequence of a historical
commodity Bboom^ that saw the volume and price of certain minerals, energy
resources, and agricultural commodities skyrocket. This boom, which provided
the foundation underlying China’s renewed ties to many resource-rich countries
([8]: 58), appears to have ended now that commodity prices finally dropped.
Many argue that Chinese investments have been big on promises but short on
actual implementation. The problem of cultural clashes has been mentioned
especially in this context.
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Such a discourse on center-periphery relations is likely to resurface as an important
theme in the Argentine congressional debates, especially as multinationals have in the
past been accused of using FDI as an instrument to manifest an alleged exploitative
nature of center-periphery relations:
Hypothesis 2: Latin American discourses of center-periphery relations and the
role FDI should play in the economy are re-routed towards Argentina-China
relations and the role Chinese FDI (exemplified in the space-monitoring sta-
tion) should play in the Argentine economy.
The relative discipline levels in the Legislative are extremely high for both main
parties in Argentina, Peronism and Radical [16, 17, 33], and it is extremely rare for a
legislator to vote against his/her party’s position. Those party members who strongly
oppose the position taken by the party generally will leave the floor at the time of the
vote or less frequently will register their abstention ([17]:157).
Two dimensions best capture the political attitudes of Argentine legislators: the left/
right cleavage and the Peronist/non-Peronist divide [44]. Because the two main Ar-
gentinean political parties—the UCR and Peronist Party—occupy quite similar posi-
tions in the right/left scale (both parties are in the center-left spectrum), the second
dimension (Peronist/non-Peronist) becomes, at times, more relevant. Peronism com-
bines two peculiar characteristics: high discipline and low ideological cohesion among
its legislators. For example, most of the Peronist politicians who had been fervent
advocates of neoliberal policies under President Menem became fervent advocates of
State-led policies under President Kirchner ([18]: 68). In addition, it is common to find
both right wing and left wing Peronists coexisting at the same time in both chambers
and voting together. These two characteristics, high discipline and low ideological
cohesion, made the Peronist Party a strong and enduring one.
Jones [17] identified three primary determinants of the highly disciplined voting
behavior: First, at the provincial-level, and to a lesser extent at the national-level, the
party has a great deal of control over a legislator’s access to the ballot, and hence their
opportunity for reelection. Second, most legislators pursue political career pathways
that are strongly linked to the party. Third, legislators who consistently vote against
their party are likely to be expelled ([17]:159). At the time the Chinese space-motoring
station was debated in Congress, the branch of the Peronist Party of the governing
president (first Nestor and thereafter Cristina Kirchner) had 113 out of the 257 seats in
the Chamber of Deputies (44%) and 32 out of 72 seats in the Chamber of Senators
(44%). To guarantee at least 51% of the votes to pass the bill, the government had to be
cohesive and appeal to all branches of the Peronist Party to vote unanimously.
Accordingly, the main cleavage in the National Congress tends to be the
government-opposition division [18], reflecting the more strategic than ideological
approach of Argentina’s main parties [44]. Jones et al. [18] argue that the Argentine
Congress, while certainly much more of a reactive veto player than a proactive agenda
setter, is nevertheless an important actor in the policy process. They observe that during
the 1989–2007 period the party holding the majority dominated the legislative process
through agenda control. The opposition was left in a very reactive position.
As the space-monitoring station project was discussed during an electoral year and
the Kirchner government had a majority in the legislature, it made an effort to pass as
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many bills as possible. Speeches by politicians in government and the opposition
became more polarized and aggressive, aiming to appeal to the public in view of the
upcoming presidential elections. Historically, Peronist rhetoric employs a logic of Bus
vs. them^ (Bus^ referring to friends or Bcompañeros^ and Bthem^ referring to enemies),
places great emphasis on Bloyalty^ among Peronists and often accuses the opposition
of being allied with foreign interests that undermine the Bnational interest^. Ideological
differences are less likely to be at the center of the political debate:
Hypothesis 3: Debates in the Argentine Congress on the Chinese space-
monitoring station are not driven by any particular ideological rift or diverging
foreign policy paradigms, but follow a clear division between the Peronists in
government and non-Peronists forming the opposition.
Methodological Strategy: Disentangling Embedded Perceptions of China
in Parliamentary Speeches
As a preliminary exploratory exercise, we analyzed Argentine public opinion data to shed
some light on the role ideology, attitudes towards the US and Peronism play in forming
views about China. We used data retrieved by the Project ‘Las Americas y el Mundo’ for
2015. The sample was comprised of 733 individuals, representative of the country’s
population.We ran a logistic regression for the following dichotomous dependent variable:
BIn your view, if China’s economy grew to be as large as that of the United States, do you
think that would be positive for the world?^ One was coded as a positive answer, and zero
as a negative. We included as independent variables ideology (left-right, on a scale of 1 to
10), a dummy for thosewho consider themselves Peronists (1 being Peronist), a dummy for
those who declare admiration for the US as the main feeling towards that country and the
respondents’ opinion about China’s impact on Argentina (this is an ordinal variable based
on the question BOverall, how would you rate the influence of China on Argentina? Very
positive (1), positive (2), no opinion (3), negative (4), very negative (5)^).
The findings, reported in Table 2, show that Peronists are more favorable to the idea
of China challenging the economic leadership of the US, as are people who side
towards the left of the political spectrum. Also, the probability was smaller among
those who thought China exerted a negative influence in Argentina, ceteris paribus.
This confirms that, among the general public, Peronists and those leaning towards left-
wing ideologies tend to be more critical of the US and more favorable to China.
Moving on to examining the specificities of the congressional debate, we compiled
all speeches delivered in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate that addressed the
Chinese space-monitoring station.7
The congressional discussions lasted for several hours. In total, 30 members of
Congress expressed their views on the issue, making this source very rich in content.
The project was first discussed in the Senate on 17 December 2014, where 36 legislators
voted in favor, 27 against and none abstained. Afterwards, on 25 February 2015, the
project was debated in the Chamber of Deputies, where 133 legislators voted in favor,
7 The European Space Station project was not discussed in Congress, evidencing how it was less controversial
than the Chinese project.
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107 against and none abstained. The parliamentary discussions were obtained from the
website of the Argentine Legal Information System (SAIJ), part of the Ministry of
Justice.8 Through another online platform, Decada Votada,9 we identified the vote of
each of the legislators to identify each speech as either in favor or against the investment.
We followed a summative technique of content analysis by identifying and quantifying
certain words or content in text with the purpose of understanding the contextual use of
these words or content ([12]:1284). A summative approach to qualitative content analysis
goes beyond mere word counts to include latent content analysis, which refers to the
process of interpretation of content in light of the context in which the discourse occurs.
Using Wordstat – a software that groups words by topic – we created several
discursive categories, or ‘groupings’, following an inductive logic [29]. The groupings
were created through a function in the software called Btopic extraction^, which is based
on factor analysis. Such extraction is achieved by computing a document frequency
matrix, or alternatively by segmenting documents into smaller chunks and computing a
segment frequency matrix. Once this matrix is obtained, a factor analysis with varimax
rotation is computed in order to extract a small number of factors.We asked the software
to group the legislative speeches into five main clusters. All words with a factor loading
higher than 0.4 (the default criterion in the software) were then retrieved as part of the
extracted topic. While in hierarchical cluster analysis, a word may only appear in one
cluster, topic modeling using factor analysis may result in a word being associated with
more than one cluster, a characteristic that more realistically represents the polysemous
nature of some words as well as the multiplicity of context of word usages.
We then proceeded to interpreting the word groupings created by the software in
light of the literature on Argentinian legislative behavior. We followed Van Dijk [50] by
enriching our quantitative analysis with qualitative components of political discourse
analysis, taking into account that legislative speeches are meant to legitimize a political
position. Legislators speak up for several reasons: they argue for or against legislative
proposals; they scrutinize the executive and they send signals to their constituents,
8 Accessible at http://www.infojus.gob.ar/
9 Accessible at http://www.decadavotada.com.ar/. Decada Votada provides information on each nominal vote
for both chambers, with details on how each legislator voted and allowing for analysis by partisan and
provincial groupings.
Table 2 China-US cleavage in public opinion
Coefficient Standard error T-test Statistical
significance
Peronist 0.76 0.21 3.61 ***
Ideology –0.06 0.02 2.52 *
Admires US 0.13 0.20 0.70
China in Argentina 1.77 0.17 10.23 ***
Statistical significance * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Chi2 test =0.0000, Pseudo R2 = 0.16, N = 733
Data is publicly available at http://www.lasamericasyelmundo.cide.edu/
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fellow party members, or other members of parliament ([38]: 333). This case study
ultimately works as a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods [3].
Untying the Knot: What Do Legislators Say of China?
We created a cluster map of the five main discursive groupings of legislators who voted
against the project (Fig. 2), as well as those who voted in favor of it (Fig. 3). The order
1 to 5 in the figures represent the ranking of importance of each topic in the speeches.
We then proceeded to their interpretation in light of the content of the speeches. We
interpreted the discourse ‘groupings’ for each box, using discourse analysis and
exemplifying with textual quotes, translated from Spanish.
It becomes immediately apparent from Fig. 2 that the United States, financial
dependence, and the intrusiveness as well as potential dual-use nature of the Chinese
space-monitoring played an important part in the discourse advanced by those voting
against the project. Words of particular significance in Fig. 2 (by importance of
associated topic category and frequency of occurrence) are: Latin America, United
States, deficit, million, dollars, ten, trade, military goals, deep space, army, Neuquén,
control, base, hectares, commission, Chinese, construction, first, world power and
relations.
The central discursive grouping, formed by the words in box 1, can be summarized
by the theme ‘asymmetry of power.’ Oscar Aguad (UCR), who is deputy of the
province of Cordoba, argued in relation to these asymmetries:
B[Kirchner’s] government rejected, perhaps with good reason, the agreement they
wanted to do with the United States, the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas
[…] What they said then was: ‘we cannot associate with the US because that will
Fig. 2 Word clusters of the legislators who voted against the project
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consolidate a primary goods production matrix in Argentina.’ Nevertheless, today
we are doing the same with China.^
This quote confirms the mirroring with the United States suggested by the first
hypothesis. There is a clear mention of Kirchner’s government being anti-American,
providing some initial confirmation of hypothesis 3, and there is a comparison between
the US and China. It is argued that the patterns of asymmetry existing between
Argentina and the US—which are rooted in the commodity specialization of the
Argentine economy—also apply to relations with China.
Pablo Javkin (Coalición Cívica, province of Santa Fe) cited Brazil as an example to
be followed when handling power asymmetries with China. Previous empirical work
found that Brazil’s image has in the past been used as an inverted mirror in Argentinean
domestic debates, where Brazil is portrayed as a rising power and Argentina as a
country in decline [32]. Pablo Javkin argued: BDiscussing the center-periphery logic
means setting a strategy. Brazil did it. Let’s do it as well.^ Furthermore, Deputy Miguel
Giubergia (UCR, province of Jujuy) pointed out that BBrazil refused to grant benefits to
China the same way Argentina is doing^. We observe in both Javkin and Giubergia the
use of Brazil as a mirror that should inspire Argentina. Both statements assume a
center-periphery logic, as suggested by hypothesis 2.
The second discursive grouping among opposition legislators (box 2 in Fig. 2)
captures fear over China’s future military might. Laura Esper (Frente Renovador,
province of Buenos Aires) argued: BIt is a concern that CLTC […] reports directly to
the Department of Arms and the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Army
[…]. So this gives, without a doubt, a strong military mark to this installation.^
Concerns over China controlling the space-monitoring station for military purposes
are fueled further by suspicions about strong connections between China’s economic
players and the military.
Fig. 3 Word clusters of the legislators who voted in favor of the project
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Christian Gribaudo (Union PRO, province of Buenos Aires) stated:
BAs for geostrategic and military issues, I have no certainties. It would have been
enough to simply add a clause […] establishing a ban on military uses, but this was
not done.Does anyone knowwhether in 2050, 2065, or even after that, the function of
this agreement will not have a geostrategic and military use to China in our country?^
We observe in Gribaudo’s speech a mention to the uncertainties – especially
geopolitical ones – inherent to long-term relations with China, reflecting the tacit idea
that China will certainly change the world order in the years to come.
From box 3 we interpreted a discursive grouping addressing the issue of Argentina’s
geopolitical positioning vis-à-vis former, existing and emerging world powers. Deputy
Fabián Rogel (UCR, province of Entre Rios) signaled that:
BThe agreements we are now considering arrive late for a government that is
ending soon and it should have drawn up a strategic policy plan no less than two
years ago. No one can bear the thought that, after twelve years in office, [the
government] has finally achieved the replacement of both the old European
model [of dependence] and that of domination by the United States with a new
model of domination, that of an empire looming at least over Asia if not over
Latin America: China^.
Rogel is critical of Peronism by claiming that the country was replacing one regional
hegemon with another, due to the incumbent government lacking any long-term
strategy towards China. As previously, we observe here a strong government-
opposition division and references to the US as well as a center-periphery logic.
Claudio Lozano (Unidad Popular, province of Buenos Aires) argued in this regard:
B[I]n the southern region of our country, there is a military base on the Malvinas
Islands [that is controlled by Great Britain]. We also know that Patagonia is a
territory to populate and that China is a country with a large population density.
Knowing the importance of the southern region in terms of mineral resources, oil
and gas, and fish, as well as in terms of its fresh water, it would be extremely
prudent […] to think a little deeper and less hastily about this agreement,
especially when the government has committed for fifty years^.
Lozano brings up colonialism from Britain as an example of what could end up
occurring with China. There is the concern that, in the long term, China will take
advantage of the center-periphery power imbalance that have historically marked
Argentina’s foreign relations, to exploit natural resources and land in Argentina.
The geopolitical concerns also include the discrepancy between US action towards
China and Argentinean accommodation of China by allowing the construction of the
space-monitoring station. Gilberto Alegre (Frente Renovador, province of Buenos
Aires) argued: BThe US is moving its entire fleet to the Pacific because of its conflict
with China, and we will give up territory and sovereignty to the Chinese^. This phrase
implicitly suggests that Argentina might have to align with the US, as having good
relations with both countries may be geopolitically implausible.
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The lower-left cluster, in box 4, encompasses the arguments for the domestic impact
of the agreement. There were concerns about the agreement giving permission to the
Chinese government to build through direct awards (that is, by avoiding domestic laws
for public bidding). For instance, Patricia Bullrich (Unión PRO, province of Buenos
Aires) said: B[…] it is possible that these constructions will be made without any kind
of bidding, without following basic rules of transparency, which would be necessary for
the public works not to be a matter of discretion and subject to corruption.^
Following a strong government-opposition division, the opposition claimed the lack
of transparency in granting awards would allowKirchner’s government to make discrete
recommendations to Chinese companies that have links to Kirchner’s party.10 Araceli
Rossi (Unión por Cordoba, province of Cordoba) stated that Bthere is no guarantee that
the lowest price will be paid, much less can we guarantee the quality of input used for the
completion of works.^ In the same line, Elisa Carrio (ARI, province of City of Buenos
Aires) argued: BAs this agreement allows direct awards, it violates Article 27 of the
National Constitution, which states: ‘The federal government is obliged to strengthen its
relations of peace and commerce with foreign powers through treaties that are in
accordance with the principles of public law established in this Constitution.’^ This
line of discourse also means to call attention to the fact that the two dams to be built in
the province of Santa Cruz (where Kirchner hails from) were financed by China, and the
contracts were awarded to companies owned by people with close ties to Kirchner’s
party: Bfriends of the power.^
One of the most notorious alleged cases of corruption in Argentina during Cristina
Kirchner’s presidency involves the conglomerate owned by Mr. Lazaro Baez, a
businessman related to the Kirchner family. His name was mentioned four times during
the speeches of those legislators who opposed the space-monitoring station agreement,
as part of an attempt to accuse the government of corruption in the bidding process.
Finally, the lower-right cluster of the figure shows a group of words criticizing
economic relations with China that are based on the export of primary goods, which
reflects concerns of an unbalanced relationship. Representative Araceli Rossi (Unión
por Cordoba, province of Cordoba) argued that BArgentina continues to sign agreements
with China. The deficit in the trade balance has reached billions of dollars and is still
growing. That is, some [the Chinese] get a lot and some [we] get very little.^ Claudio
Lozano (Unidad Popular, province of Buenos Aires) said that B96 percent of what we
sell to China is of primary production, of which 85 percent is soybean, soybean oil, and
crude oil, and what we receive from China are manufactured goods.^ These imbalances
present in Argentine-Chinese trade were extended to the issue of economic asymmetries
in the space-monitoring station agreement. Mario Negri (Unión por Cordoba, province
of Cordoba) said: BThe work is done with Chinese capital, Chinese companies, Chinese
technology and Chinese labor. And that obviously creates an imbalance^.
Having analyzed the discourses employed by those criticizing the Chinese space-
monitoring station, we now turn to analyzing the speeches by legislators who supported
the project, following the same strategy as before. An initial examination of the word
groupings in Fig. 3 presents a strong difference to those found in Fig. 2. While the
words shown in Fig. 2 appear to emphasize issues of dependence, power, hegemony
10 The companies said to be Brelated to the Kircher’s party^ are the China Machinery Engineering Corporation
(CMEC), China Gezhouba Group and the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC).
Don’t cry for me BArgenchina^: Unraveling Political Views
and a China threat, the words in Fig. 3 more reflect a discourse about collaboration,
opportunities, economic gain, the technicalities of the project and praise of the current
government. Words of particular significance in Fig. 3 are: Space, Brazil, exchange,
bilateral, strategic relationship, dollars, million, commercial, workers, infrastructure,
European Agency, CONAE, exploration, Neuquén, possibility, scientific, activities,
Kirchner, Nestor, momentum.
The main argument (see box 1) again concerns the bilateral economic relationship with
China, but in this case the discourse highlights the gains that Argentina experiences from a
deep relationshipwith China. For example, Deputy Roberto Feletti (Frente Para la Victoria,
province of Buenos Aires) defended the deal because of China’s economic strengths
compared to those of Brazil, the EU, and the US: BThe truth is that when looking at the
international integration with China, the European Union, Brazil and the US, one will
realize that the only dynamic country which grew strongly in these years was China,
overcoming the 2008/2009 crisis. Not so wrong to choose a bilateral agreement with
China.^ This argumentation highlights China’s short-term role as the Bbelle of the ball.^
Furthermore, China is presented as an alternative to Argentina’s excessive dependence on
Brazil, whose government is said to have forgotten about Argentina:
BAmong the four countries with which we have major amounts of trade, China is
the one which has grown the most. Therefore, it is logical that at this stage we
have a privileged bilateral relationship with that nation. On Brazil, during the
third Workers Party government headed by Dilma Rousseff, its foreign policy
changed, privileging the relationship with the BRICS to the detriment of
Mercosur and UNASUR.^
The upper-left corner cluster reveals a discursive grouping that explores the
difference in scrutiny between the Chinese and European space-monitoring
stations. The speeches of legislators who supported the agreement contained
several mentions of the ESA station insisting on the fact that both projects were
similar in nature. For example, Deputy Martin Rodrigo Gill (Frente Para la
Victoria, province of Córdoba) argued that Bthere is a degree of prejudice and
paranoia about the location of this station in our country. The space-monitoring
station in Neuquen has no different characteristics to that opperating in
Malargüe […], which was the result of another agreement with the European
Space Agency.^ Deputy Alicia Comelli (Neuquén’s Popular Movement, prov-
ince of Neuquén) pointed to the fears of power asymmetries with China as
suggested by hypothesis 2:
B[I]f the entire argument [against the project] is going to be about the fear of
asymmetries, it should be clarified that there were no such fears against other,
worse, asymmetries, as when there was the installation of Malargüe with the
European Space Agency in partnership with NASA, which is basically British.^
Asymmetries also played a central role in political discourses favoring the
project, including latent references to American hegemony. Yet the argument
was that no difference should exist between asymmetries with China and
previous regional hegemons.
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The upper-right cluster of discursive groupings echoes the idea that Argentine-
Chinese relations were evolving into a ‘comprehensive strategic relationship’ between
the two countries and for that reason, the agreement needs to be understood as a big
step in the political approximation between both countries. For example, Carlos Heller
(Frente Nuevo Encuentro, province of Buenos Aires) made the point that signing
agreements with China was part of a broad political alliance:
B[I]t has been ten years that [a strategic partnership] has been built, and now the
steps are being taken to turn this strategic relationship into a comprehensive
strategic relationship. What does this mean? It refers to something that goes
beyond commercial, technological, scientific bonds and extends towards political
positions, sharing positions in international organizations.^
Sharing common political positions in international organizations is one of the last
stages in the process of bringing two countries closer together, and Heller celebrates
that Argentina is heading in that direction with China. Implicit in this may be a reduced
concern over China’s future military might.
Paired with the idea of strengthening bilateral relations, there were mentions of and
praises for former president Nestor Kirchner’s initiative of kicking off a strategic
relationship with China back in 2004. Some legislators argued that voting in favor of
this agreement was a matter of being coherent with Kirchner’s foreign policy of
alignment with China. This conforms to hypothesis 3.
The lower-left cluster represents a discursive grouping that can be summarized as
BChina is the best alternative, Brazil forgot us, and the US and EU are the ‘old world’
we no longer want to belong to.^ Peronist legislators in particular hold a positive view
of closer ties with China, which is seen as an alternative to the neoliberal policies
advanced by the US in the region. For instance, deputy Adriana Puiggros (Frente Para
la Victoria, province of Buenos Aires) argued that.
B[The opposition] shouts fears against possible Chinese imperialism or against an
invasion, and they even argue that an antenna has been installed for military
purposes, when in fact it has a dimension of 35 meters in diameter and 45 meters
in height […]; it is impossible to have a military purpose. So in fact Chinese
imperialism becomes a smokescreen aimed at defending the Western neoliberalist
hegemony of the United States.^
This combines with arguments explaining why China should be a preferred country
to partner with. Deputy Julia Perié (Frente para la Victoria, province of Misiones)
argued that China is different from other powerful nations in that it is an Bemerging^
one, and Kirchner supported the foreign policy of strengthening South-South relations,
Bwhich led us to that historic moment when we said ‘no’ to the FTAA and ‘yes’ to the
consolidation of other regional blocs: Mercosur, UNASUR, and CELAC.^ In this view,
strengthening ties with China is framed within the foreign policy of South-South
relations.
Finally, the lower-right cluster offers a discursive grouping addressing the positive
impact of China’s FDI in Argentina. Alfredo Dato (Frente Para la Victoria, province of
Tucuman) mentioned:
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BI think there’s an issue we must clarify and not get caught up in the clauses. We
must clarify what a satisfactory role of foreign capital is in the national economy,
i.e., if it contributes to the development of domestic productive forces or plays a
role of despoiler of these forces […], intended to widen the pockets of the owners
of foreign capital. […] [W]ith this agreement, will Argentina be a better nation? Is
this agreement confined only to a financing process or also a process of economic
and technological progress? Clearly, the possibility to access technology available
today in China represents a quantum leap forward for our national economy.^
Dato exposes the argument that not all FDI may be beneficial for Argentina, but that
Chinese FDI will have a positive impact.
This argument may dovetail with a critical view on domestic businesspeople and
agribusiness producers who are considered to be aligned with the US. As Deputy Oscar
Martinez (Movimiento Solidario Popular, province of Santa Cruz) stated:
BA project with China will not come to meet the great needs facing the country
and all the people in science and technology, but neither will the petty politics of
businessmen, industrialists, and members of the Rural Society who only focus on
how best to do business at the expense of the people^.
This exposes a Bwe-against-them^ dichotomy that is much stronger among Peronist
legislators. BWe^ is used to refer to those interested in protecting national interests and
economic development, while Bthem^ refers to agribusiness, neoliberals, speculators,
and those who are pro-American.
Conclusions
This study employed a mixed-method content and discourse analysis to investigate
why members of Congress in Argentina hold such varied views about Chinese
investments. In Table 3 we identify five common themes towards which those in favor
and those against the Chinese space-monitoring station have formulated opposing
discourses, which came to the fore in the congressional debates. As becomes apparent,
the themes are all related to uncertainties about how to handle China as a new powerful
political and economic player in the world. As already discussed in the previous
section, these themes effectively confirm both hypothesis 1 and 2 (see right column
in Table 3). In addition, the congressional debates on all these thematic areas evidenced
either criticism of the Peronist government by the opposition or praise for Peronist
policies by the Peronists themselves, confirming hypothesis 3.
Although the broad issues are the same, both sides address them in fundamentally
different ways, informed by partisan politics, attitudes toward the US as a regional
power as well as ideological perspectives: China may have hegemonic tendencies, but
it also reins in US hegemony; new asymmetries may be created, but diversification of
global power structures could benefit Argentina; China may be a future threat, but it
could also be a strong ally; economic relations between China and Argentina may be
uneven, but China’s relative economic and technological strength may also provide
major benefits to Argentina; and Chinese FDI may be economically harmful to
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Argentina, although proponents of the space-monitoring station see it as having a
positive impact. The focus of the arguments rested primarily on geopolitical interests
and matters of economic impact, and were not driven by other possible themes, such as
nationalistic sentiments or cultural distance.
Overall, those voting against the space-monitoring station see it as part of a trend
towards empowerment of China, ultimately at the detriment of Argentine national
interests politically, militarily and economically. But those in favor of the space-
monitoring station see in the same issues a set of political and economic opportunities
for Argentina.
To emphasize their own particular take on these same issues, both sides drew on
narratives from Argentina’s negative historical experiences, its particular regional
context and its subdued positioning in the rest of the world. They did so by drawing
on familiar popular concepts such as Bhegemony ,^ Basymmetry of power^, Bcenter-
periphery logic^, Bimbalance^ and Bcommodification^. Yet, they use them to support
opposing views. The critics are concerned that asymmetries in relations with the US
and EU/Britain would be replicated through further engagement with China via FDI,
while proponents of the deal – who may or may not take a favorable view on China
overall – argue that engaging with China and inviting Chinese FDI creates a desirable
alternative and counterbalance to those asymmetries from the Bold^ world order. These
differences are fueled further by the traditional rifts about economic ideology that are
entrenched in Argentinian society, between those advocating a more open economy and
open investment relations, and those concerned about the negative implications this
may bring with it.
An interesting finding from this study is thus that the discourse about Chinese FDI is
formulated from within the particular societal and geopolitical contexts of the host
country, Argentina. The critical views of the US as well as the center-periphery logic
underpinned by differences of economic ideology are characteristic of the Latin
American context and are being employed to advance competing discourses about
Chinese FDI in Argentina. That being the case, however, it is less clear whether the
findings of the study can provide explanations for perceptions and reactions to Chinese
FDI in other regions of the world. Even when the nature of the Chinese project is
similar, it is quite possible that the discourses employed to argue in favor or against it
Table 3 Summary of findings
Issue Opposition block Government block H*
Geopolitical positioning US regional hegemony replaced by
Chinese power
Good relations with China a useful
counterpart to the US
H1&2 &
H3
Asymmetry of power and
center-periphery logic
Asymmetry with China – as with the
US – puts Argentina at a
disadvantage
Asymmetries with China no different
from those with EU/Britain and
US
H1&2 &
H3
Future economic and military
might of China
Potential military threat to Argentina Political alliance through
comprehensive partnership
H2 & H3
Bilateral economic
relationship
Unbalanced Bcommodified^ trade
relations with China
China’s growth provides major
economic benefits
H2 & H3
View of Chinese FDI in
Argentina
FDI as an imposed necessity with
negative impact
FDI is welcome, with positive
impact
H2 & H3
*Indicates confirmation of hypothesis by a particular theme
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would differ, bringing in local aspects that carry argumentative weight in the context of
a particular locality. The identification of these discourses will, however, have to be left
for future studies.
The interpretation we did of the legislative speeches allows us to conclude that
China may well be a double-edged sword for Argentina, where a mix of threats and
opportunities creates uncertainties that ultimately produce very different discourses
about Chinese FDI. Given these current differences, the question is whether China will
gradually become a constant divisive factor in domestic politics and form a cleavage
just as the US has done in the past. This new cleavage would likely overlap with other
existing divides, such as government-opposition and Peronists-anti-Peronists. Without
regard of the potential depth of any such cleavage, the political discourse about China
in Argentina will certainly remain complex and multifaceted in the years to come.
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